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In the past few years, the corporate 'takeover device of the cash
tender offer has grown in frequency, and thus in importance.
Concomitantly, legislation designed to sweep this relatively un-
regulated method of acquiring corporate control into the ambit
of the SEC has been proffered. In response to the reasons which
have been propounded in favor of such regulation, the author
analyzes the pending legislation, appraises its likely consequences,
and evaluates its objectives.
O F THE various methods available for taking over control of a
corporation," the cash tender offer for corporate shares is the
least regulated. A brief look at the alternative methods will show
why. An exchange for shares in a different corporation entails a sale
of those shares within the meaning of the Securities Act of 19332 and
is therefore subject to all the disclosure requirements of that act. A
merger (and this would generally be true of share exchanges as well)
* This article represents a reply to the views expressed by Manuel F. Cohen, Chair-
man of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in A Note on Takeover Bids and
Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966). The present article is an elabo-
ration of the author's commentary, Tender Offers and Free Markets, 2 MERGERS &
AcQuissnONS 91 (1966), which also contains a speech by Chairman Cohen expressing
substantially the same views as the article cited supra. Cohen, Takeover Bids, 2 MERGERS
& AcQusrrMONs 87 (1966). This present article does not deal with the matter of
corporate purchases of stock discussed by Chairman Cohen.
t BA. 1950, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1952, University of Chicago; LL.M. 1953,
J.S.D. 1966, Yale University. Professor of Law, The George Washington University
Law School.
2 These methods are described, compared, and analyzed in Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110 (1965); Manne, Some Theoretical
Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1427 (1964).
2§ 2 (3), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (3) (1964). See Loss, SEcuu-
Tins REGULATION 513 (2d ed. 1961). The act covers "offers to sell" as well as "sales."
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is subject to the various antitrust laws and a variety of constraints
resulting from the Internal Revenue Code. Proxy fights are heavily
regulated by the SEC's proxy rules promulgated under Section 14 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 However, heretofore only
a small and minor body of case law has occasionally been applicable
to cash transactions for a controlling block of shares. 4 Now, there-
fore, come Congress and the SEC to set the matter straight. This
freak survivor of that dangerous, prehistoric era of unregulated free
markets must not be tolerated.
Bills have been submitted in the current session of Congressu to
3 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
'The cases are collected and discussed in the following articles: Andrews, The
Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505
(1965); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957); Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1956).
rThe bill, submitted by Senator Harrison Williams, would amend the Securities Act
of 1934 and reads in pertinent part as follows:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
is amended by adding at the end thereof a new subsection as follows:
"(1) Every person, who by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or in-
directly acquires or obtains the right to acquire the beneficial ownership of, or in-
creases or obtains the right to increase his beneficial ownership to, more than 10 per
centum of any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to section 12
of this title shall, within seven days after such acquisition, or the obtaining of such
right to acquire, send to the issuer of the security at its principal executive office,
by registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded,
and file with the Commission, a statement as herein below described.
"(A) Each such statement shall contain such of the information specified in sub-
sections (i)- (v) of this section, and such additional information, as the Commission
may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
"(i) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on whose behalf the
purchases have been or are to be effected,
"(ii) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be
used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or proposed
purchase price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other consideration
borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such
security, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties thereto, except
that where a source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a
bank as defined in section 3 (a) (6) hereof it will be sufficient to so state,
"(iii) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire control
of the business of the issuer of the securities any plans or proposals which such persons
may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to, or merge it with any other per-
sons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate structure,
"(iv) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and the
number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or indirectly, by
(a) such person, and (b) by each associate (as defined in the rules and regulations of
the Commission under this Act) of such person, giving the name and address of each
such associate, and
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"(v) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any
person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts
or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, di-
vision of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the persons
with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered into,
and giving the details thereof.
"(4) The provisions of this subsection and of section 2 of this bill shall not apply
in respect of-
"(B) Any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which, together with
all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class during the
preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of the outstanding securities of
that class at the time of the acquisition. As used herein the term "outstanding securi-
ties" of a class shall not include securities of the class held by or for the account of the
issuer.
"(5) It shall be unlawful for any issuer, in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors or in order to prevent such acts and prac-
tices as -are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative, to purchase any equity security
which it has issued. Such rules and regulations may require such issuer to provide
holders of equity securities of such class with such information relating to the reasons
for such purchase, the source of funds, the number of shares to be purchased, the price
to be paid for such securities, the method of purchase, and such additional informa-
tion, as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, or which the Commission deems to be material to a
determination whether such security should be sold.
"Sac. 2. That section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by add-
ing at the end thereof new subsections as follows:
"(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails
or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, to make a tender offer for, or a request or
invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant
to section 12 of this title which, if consummated, would result in such person owning
beneficially more than 10 per centum of such security, unless five days prior to the
making of such tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, such person has filed
with the Commission a statement containing such of the information specified in para-
graphs (A) and (B) of subsection 1, section 1 of this bill, and such additional informa-
tion, as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. All requests or invita-
tions for tenders or advertisements making a tender offer or requesting or inviting
tenders of such a security shall be filed as a part of such statement and shall contain
such of the information contained in such statement as the Commission may by rules
and regulations prescribe. Preliminary copies of any additional material soliciting or
requesting such tender offers subsequent to the initial solicitation or request shall
contain such information as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors and
shall be filed with the Commission at least two days prior to the date copies of such
material are first sent or given to security holders.
"(3) Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to accept
or reject a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders shall be made in accordance
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regulate cash tender offers, provide for the disclosure of considerable
amounts of information by offerors, and give the Securities and Ex-
change Commission considerable rule-making authority in the area.
In a recent article, Manuel Cohen, Chairman of the SEC, defended
the major thrust of this legislation" and explained the Commission's
reasons for advancing it. One would have expected the Chairman to
offer some fairly cogent reasons for wanting to add this regulatory
responsibility to those of an agency generally alleged to be over-
burdened already. And one would have expected these reasons to
be bolstered by empirical evidence and hard statistical data. But,
alas, as with so many areas of policy-making by the SEC,7 this is not
what we receive.
Chairman Cohen's principal defense rests on an argument that
seems completely to beg the question. He states, on several oc-
casions, that a cash offer for-shares should be covered by the Securities
Act of 1938, since tender offers involving an exchange of shares are
with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
"(4) Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the
expiration of seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer or request or in-
vitation are first published or sent or given to security holders, and at any time after
sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or invitation except
as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations or order as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
"(5) Where any person makes a tender offer, a request or invitation for tenders for
less than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater number
of securities is deposited pursuant thereto than such person is bound or willing to
take up and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro
rata, disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each
depositor.
(6) Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer, or request or invitation
for tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the considerations offered to
holders of such securities, such person shall pay the increased consideration to each
security holder whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the tender offer
or request or invitation for tenders whether or not such securities have been taken up
by such person before the variation of the tender offer or request or invitation.
S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The bill is reprinted in 113 CONo. REc. S. 445
(daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967). See id. at S. 443 (remarks of Senator Williams introducing
legislation); id. at S. 446 (remarks of Senator Kuchel, co-sponsor).
0 Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stoch, 22 Bus. LAW.
149 (1966). Actually, Chairman Cohen was discussing S. 2731 and H.R. 14416, intro-
duced by Senator Williams and Representative Staggers in the 89th Congress, 1st
Session, on which hearings were never held. The new bill is consistent with the posi-
tion of the SEC as indicated in Chairman Cohen's article, with one exception indicated
in note 48 infra.
7 Cf. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 10-15 (1966).
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covered and the choice confronting shareholders is not fundamentally
different in the two cases. 8 But does the existence of one form of
regulation really tell us anything about the need or desirability of
another? If the regulation of cash tender offers is desirable, it must
be for reasons other than that share exchange offers are regulated.
But even if mere analogy were a valid kind of argument, the
two types of offers do not really seem to be parallel. Chairman
Cohen ignores the fact that share exchanges as a method of taking
over corporate control were never considered by Congress in adopting
the Securities Act of 1933. Quite clearly, Congress was concerned
with new public issues of securities, since it felt that the greatest
misdeeds in the stock market involved public issues of securities with
which the public had no experience. In 1941 the SEC tried, un-
successfully, to broaden the coverage of the 1933 Act by adding the
words "or purchase" after the word "sale" in section 17a, which deals
with fraud and deceptive devices. 10 However, Congress stuck with
the "sales only" philosophy of the Securities Act. Thus, it is purely
fortuitous or coincidental that the '33 Act can be used to regulate
a form of control takeover at all. Chairman Cohen must look else-
where than to existing schemes of regulation to find a justification
for regulating cash tender offers.
In reality, the entire matter of tender offers is far more compli-
cated than Chairman Cohen has acknowledged. Again, as in 1933
and subsequently, a highly simplistic notion of "disclosure" is con-
sidered to be the panacea for all corporate ills. It is high time that
this notion was re-examined and subjected to careful study." Reli-
ance on disclosure as a basis for formulating corporate regulatory
policy can lead to unexpected and unhappy results. Careful and
realistic analysis, not slogans and guesses, are needed to avoid poten-
tially damaging policies. The purpose of this article is first to explain
what issues are really involved in the matter of takeovers and then
to examine the provisions of the proposed legislation and Chairman
8 Cohen, supra note 6, at 149, 151 (twice), 152, 156.
0 Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); Hearings on H-R. 4314 Before the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). See Landis, The Legislative
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 29 (1959).
10 See Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1426.
11 See Manne, What's So Bad About Insider Trading?, Challenge, Jan.-Feb. 1967,
p. 14.
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Cohen's defense of them. Finally, some proposals will be advanced
for improving the lot of noncontrolling shareholders in the market
for corporate control.
BACKGROUND THEORY
The subject of tender offers certainly raises some of the most
fascinating issues in the securities field. Aspects of two important
market phenomena must be understood before one can deal intelli-
gently with tender offers. Firit, it must be recognized that, for
analytical purposes, control of a corporation must be treated as any
economic good for which men compete in the market place. Second-
ly, it must be remembered that information is a valuable commodity,
not a free good, and it too is the subject of a market.
Briefly, the market for corporate control in our system operates
in the following manner: 12 if an existing corporation with publicly
traded shares is poorly managed, 13 holders of those shares will respond
by selling. This will drive the price down to the point indicated by
the quality of management which the corporation is receiving. As
the price of securities of any corporation is thought to be low relative
to the price that would be generated by more efficient managers, the
stage is set for the critical functioning of the market for corporate
control. Outsiders, whether we call them "raiders" or more polite
names, will respond to the opportunity to make substantial capital
gains (not necessarily in the tax sense) by buying control, managing
the company efficiently, and then perhaps disposing of the shares.
It is not necessary that they remain permanently to manage the
business.' 4
'- See articles cited note 1 supra; Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern
Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 399 (1962).
13 In this context "poorly managed" refers to any management policy or decision
which causes a lower stock price than any feasible alternative policy or decision would
generate.
14 Unfortunately anyone who regularly buys control of corporations and does not
remain to manage the business has been tagged with the opprobrious label, "liquidator."
The word certainly has an ominous tone to it. After all, none of us wants to be
liquidated. But the professional liquidator, if such exists, cannot be "all bad." Un-
less these individuals are performing the valuable function suggested in the text, it
will be impossible for them to succeed on any continuing basis. If they are liquidating
businesses that would be more profitably operated by someone else, their presence
in the market for company shares would cause a decline rather than a rise. This, of
course, would be self-defeating. Therefore, their continued presence must be taken as
some evidence that they are performing a socially or economically useful function. Un-
happily, it is difficult to think of a mellifluous word with a happy connotation for
[V/ol. 1967:231
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The critical thing-perhaps basic to the entire American system
of corporate capitalism-is the fantastic protection which noncon-
trolling shareholders receive as a result of the functioning of the
corporate control market. For it is this market and only this market
which in the long run guarantees the identity-of interests between
numerous small shareholders and managers who may own few or no
shares at all.:" The very existence of potential competition for the
positions of incumbent managers conditions them to think in terms
of keeping stock prices as high as possible relative to other companies
in the same industry. They do not have to understand the economics
of the market for corporate control or how it conditions them. These
pressures are present, and those who act contrary to them do not
survive. This, of course, i§ precisely what we want from our system:
efficiency, automaticity, and incentive to benefit the shareholders.
The interests of the American shareholder have obviously been
superbly protected by the functioning of this market. No alternative
theory even begins to explain the continued investment of billions
and billions of dollars with almost completely insignificant losses
resulting from malfunctioning in the system. The seeming excep-
tions, largely matters of criminal or fraudulent activity, occur
throughout any system-free market or otherwise. But given the
fantastic importance of a free, competitive market for control of
corporations, we should be very careful about the methods chosen
to deal with the few problems which may arise. Actually, traditional
criminal law, perhaps with additional administrative enforcement
aids, and civil suits have not proved inadequate to the task. Fur-
thermore, it must be remembered that every interference with the
competitive workings of this market, no matter how high the moral
aspirations of the proponents, may do profound injury to numerous
individuals investing in stocks.
This short and necessarily oversimplified description of the market
for corporate control should not be taken as a measure of the com-
plexity of the subject. The intellectual and theoretical work in this
field is just beginning, and many practical aspects remain to be
what these unsung heroes do. Indeed the most accurate term might be "corporate
garbagemen," since they clean up the messes left by the regular corporate house-
holders. Anyone for "corporate redeemer?"
' The significance of the corporate control market for both small shareholders and
managers is the crucial point missed by Berle and Means in their celebrated and in-
fluential TnE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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worked out. Nevertheless, the existence and importance of this
market would seem to be well established. It is perhaps not sur-
prising that busy government officials cannot keep fully informed
on the latest theoretical developments in their own fields, but it
is unfortunate.
MARKET METHODS
The market for corporate control functions, as we have seen,
in several different ways. The proxy fight is the best known of
these, though for various reasons it is also the least used.10  The most
important reason for its lack of popularity is that a proxy solicitation
does not yield shares on which capital gains may be realized by the
outsider. Since, as we have seen, this is perhaps the most important
factor fueling the market for corporate control, one would not expect
proxy fights to occur frequently.' 7 A proxy fight may still, in some
circumstances, be financially the most feasible method of fighting for
control. Much more attention needs to be given the question of the
effect of the SEC's proxy solicitation rules on the cost of capturing
control.' 8 Unfortunately, in this area naive ideas about shareholder
democracy still color SEC statements and policies.
The most frequently used device for acquiring control is the
merger. This device, however, is appropriately divisible into the
cases in which control is held by one individual (or a group of indi-
viduals functioning as a unit) and those in which share ownership is
widely diffused. The former case will be found on analysis to look
quite similar to the third method of acquiring control, the direct
purchase of sufficient shares. But when no strong control block of
shares exists, our law has the effect of giving most of the market
value of control to the corporate directors.' 9 In these cases, some
form of side payment will generally be made to some or all the
16 See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110,
114-15 (1965).
17 In the SEC's fiscal year 1964 only eighteen companies were reported as involved
in proxy fights for election of directors. 30 SEC ANN. REP. 62 (1964).
18 It is particularly interesting that Chairman Cohen says that the SEC "in develop-
ing our approach to these bills ... relied heavily on our experience with the proxy
rules, and particularly proxy contests." Cohen, supra note 6, at 153. Again, Chairman
Cohen seems to beg the question, since the mere existence of these proxy rules is no
justification for an extension of that philosophy to another area. But more important,
no research into and analysis of the effects of our existing proxy regulation has ever
been made.
29 Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110,
117-18 (1965).
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directors, which might, with a more effective method for stimulating
competition for control, go to the shareholders. 20
The final method of taking over control is by direct purchase of
sufficient voting shares to give the desired degree of control. The
law does not allow a direct purchase of control positions as such,21
that is, seats on a board of directors may not be sold except as part
of a transaction in which a control block of shares is transferred.
However, direct acquisitions of control of a corporation may be made
in one of several ways or in combination thereof: (1) the direct pur-
chase from an individual of a controlling block of shares; (2) gradual
acquisition of a controlling number of shares through anonymous
open market transactions; (3) a tender offer to purchase shares at a
stated price above the market; and (4) an offer of marketable securi-
ties in exchange for- the required number of shares (basically a
variant of number 3, used by corporations rather than individuals).
Each of the various methods of taking over control has advantages
and disadvantages over the others given a variety of circumstances,
including the degree of diffusion of share ownership, the financial
position of the control buyer, and numerous legal matters such as
antitrust problems, tax considerations, and SEC regulations.
Before we can examine the matter of cash tender offers in detail,
it is necessary to integrate some understanding of the market for
valuable information 22 as it affects tender offers. Information, like
any economic good, is a scarce commodity. If we are to encourage its
production, appropriate payoffs must be available as an incentive.
Clearly, the market for corporate control relies heavily on the
production, not the wide dissemination, of information about corpo-
rations. In the first instance, the potential control buyer must learn
of the existence of a poorly managed corporation.23 Not only must
20 For some suggestions for improving the functioning of this market, see notes 33-35
infra and accompanying text.
21 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962), and cases cited
therein.
22 MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKpr (1966), contains the first general
discussion of the nature and importance of the market for valuable information in the
corporate context.
23 "Poorly managed" in the present context refers to the subjective judgment of the
outsiders. The company in question may be well managed by objective standards, but
the outsider may still believe that he can improve its affairs. Compare note 13 supra.
One of the most instructive and perhaps best-known situations of the sort suggested
involved Louis Wolfson's takeover in 1949 of the Capital Transit Company in Wash-
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he know of the existence of the opportunity, he must also know with
some degree of certitude the feasibility of his acquiring control, his
ability to give the company improved management, the stock market's
reflection of any improvement, and his ability to sell out at a profit.
It is doubtful that one performing this function will be strongly
motivated by the opportunity to receive the incumbent managers'
compensation. The corporate control buyer we are most concerned
with is not by nature a bureaucratic manager. He is more likely to
be willing to take great personal (not necessarily financial) risks for
the possibility of reaping huge but uncertain rewards.24 In the con-
text of our discussion, the reward he is after is the difference between
the cost of acquiring control of the relatively inefficiently run firm
and the price he can recover for control of the resuscitated company
or by liquidation. But this is largely a profit he can realize only if
he is allowed to keep his own counsel. Public disclosure at any
point in the whole takeover-improve-sell-out cycle may seriously
diminish realizable profits and thus takeover incentives. The reason
for this will become more apparent in the ensuing discussion. For
now, however, it is important to notice that his takeover intentions
ington, D.C. This company had accumulated a tremendous amount of cash which was
neither used nor immediately needed for operating purposes. In spite of this extraor-
dinary cash position, the management maintained an exceedingly conservative divi-
dend policy. Were this the only thing they were doing wrong, the conditions for a
takeover would not have existed, since other shareholders, more interested in capital
gains than dividends, could have been found. Shares would have moved to these hands,
and the share price set by these contented shareholders would have discouraged a take-
over. The company could not then be said to be poorly managed. Most observers
have concluded that it was the dividend policy which caused the relatively low market
price for shares, but another and more crucial factor was necessarily present. From
1941 to 1949, the company showed an unmistakable trend toward lower earnings, in-
cluding a sizable deficit for 1947. It is quite possible that accounting procedures ob-
scured even greater losses. But necessarily, if the market accurately reflected underlying
reality, the shares were as low as they were, not because of dividend policy alone but
because without a higher dividend or a change in management policies the earned
surplus of the company would eventually be used up in inefficient operations. Under
these circumstances, the only hope of the shareholders was to have someone offer them
more than the prevailing market price for their shares. Wolfson was then in a posi-
tion to make enormous profits by a liquidating dividend, perhaps his goal from the
beginning. But if we begrudge him these profits, it will be the shareholders who will
suffer most. If this mechanism had not been available, the shareholders could simply
have rolled along with th6 company toward its eventual bankruptcy or reorganization.
The facts from which this depiction is taken can be found in Senate Comm. on the
Dist. of Columbia, Public Transportation Serving the District of Columbia, S. REP.
No. 1274, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
"Cf. the description of the "entrepreneur" in SCHuMPETER, TnE THEoRY oF ECo.
Nomic DEVELOPAIENT 128-56 (Opie transl. 1934).
[Vol. 1967: 231
Vol. 1967: 231) CASH TENDER OFFERS FOR SHARES 241
and his business plans-information formulated by him-are most
valuable to him if he is not forced to share this news with others.
CHAIRMAN COHEN'S ARGUMENTS
Now let us look at the arguments offered by the Chairman of the
SEC in justifying detailed regulation of cash tender offers. Generally
the Chairman believes that investors should be informed about one
seeking control before they sell to him. We are told that "this is
necessary if public investors are to stand on an equal footing with
the acquiring person in assessing the future of the company and the
value of its shares." 25 It is hard to conceive of a sentence which packs
more misunderstanding of how markets in general function and in
particular how the market for corporate control functions. Clearly,
public investors should not be on an equal footing with individuals
who have created new information and are performing a function
which necessarily benefits everyone. If we put the completely
passive shareholder on the same footing as this individual, the latter
will have little incentive to take over control of a poorly run company
and thereby protect noncontrolling shareholders from bad manage-
ment. Moralistic aspirations for equality of wealth have nothing to
do with rigorous analysis and clear understanding of the corporate
field.
Chairman Cohen elaborates his information point with an
example of a tender offer of six dollars for shares presently sell-
ing for five dollars and which can be made worth fifteen dollars
on liquidation.26 He states that "it is argued by some that the
basic factor which influences shareholders to accept a tender offer
is the adequacy of the price. But, I might ask, how can an in-
vestor evaluate the adequacy of the price if he cannot assess
the possible impact of a change in control? Certainly without
such information he cannot judge its adequacy by the current market
price." 27 Here the Chairman seems to be playing with words, par-
ticularly the word "adequacy." The proposition which he is ques-
tioning is really that shareholders, like any economically rational
human being, will compare alternatives in order to make economic
decisions. Thus, if one option (selling shares at six dollars) is worth
2 Cohen, supra note 6, at 150.
01d. at 151.27 Ibid.
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more than a second option (holding shares selling on the market for
five dollars), then, ceteris paribus, it makes sense to take the first
option (and to sell the shares). This is what is always involved in
any shareholder -decision, and it is in no way contradicted by the fact
that they would rather have fifteen than six dollars. But that tells
us absolutely nothing about whether we should require the outsider
to disclose information about his plans for the business worth nine
dollars per share. The argument Chairman Cohen is disputing is
actually that shareholders would rather have six than five dollars,
and that is strange indeed.
Let us consider the example used by Chairman Cohen. We
should want to know first why the present management does not con-
sider liquidating the company. Clearly that would seem at first
glance, under the conditions posed, to be a part of their fiduciary
obligation. However, we all know that there is no safe and simple
way of giving an affirmative thrust to this notion. 28 Neither the SEC
nor the shareholder's derivative suit can function satisfactorily in this
context. Liquidation may in fact be disliked by the existing man-
agement group because they are protecting their own jobs at the
expense of the shareholders, but they will always allege that it is their
"business judgment" that the company should not be liquidated,
28 Actually, one suggestion which might benefit shareholders is a statement of the
liquidation value of the company filed along with normal financial reports. But this
runs headlong into the SEC's firm holding that only historical cost can be carried in
the company's published reports. Efforts to give this helpful additional information
have been firmly rejected by the agency, even under the proxy solicitation rules when
the issue on which shareholders' proxies are being solicited is liquidation of the issuer.
See RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 20.9-.10 (2d ed. 1966). See
also id. 3.9-11.
Jt is most ironic then that Chairman Cohen should state in connection with
the hypothetical example referred to in the text: "Certainly the company's shareholders
would want to know about liquidation plans. Indeed, it is the plan to liquidate which
makes the bidder willing to pay more than $5 per share. Whether or not the
company's liquidation value is generally known is not important, for without some-
one to carry out the liquidation, this value is unobtainable .... " Cohen, supra note
6, at 151. (Emphasis added.)
One certainly must wonder just what kind of disclosure rule Chairman Cohen has
in mind. Is the outsider, unlike management, free, or required, to tell shareholders
what the company is worth in liquidation? Is the value really unimportant if the
shareholders merely know that someone thinks liquidation value is higher than present
market value? Clearly it is not unimportant in any case, but it is probably more
important to the shareholders for effectively dealing with the incumbents than it is
for making a rational decision about the outsider's offer. As we have already seen,
the outsider may provide the shareholders' best way out of a losing proposition.
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and without some very special reason few courts would second-guess
them on the point.
29
The market for corporate control, functioning through pri-
vate decision-making, does provide a solution for this problem.
But the incentives necessary to make this market function come
from the very profits Chairman Cohen seeks to have shared with
all shareholders. Like many share-the-wealth programs, Chairman
Cohen's scheme ignores the problems of economic incentive. Un-
less someone performs this function; the noncontrolling shareholders
will simply have to be content with their five-dollar shares. One
can agree with Chairman Cohen that a ten-dollar gain is better than
a one-dollar gain, but certainly we should take issue with the neces- -
sary implication of his logic that a one-dollar gain is not better thaKi
nothing. And there is no obvious middle ground.30 Once we leave
the workable ground of competitive prices, we are stuck in the morass
of "fair" or "adequate" price, and other useless metaphysical notions.
As yet no economist has figured a scientific way of giving content to
those empty concepts. It is strange that a Commission dedicated to
making capitalism function successfully would even try.
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Disclosure of Identity
We can now take a detailed look at provisions of the bill regu-
lating tender offers, which the SEC is supporting. First of all, it
would require full disclosure of the names, business associates, and
background of the offeror. The SEC's thinking on this point is fairly
obvious though not expressly spelled out. Publicity is needed to
disclose to the market the possibility of a takeover by very well-
2 See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 778 (1952). The litigated cases have dealt almost ex-
clusively with close corporations, though the problem of failure to liquidate may arise
with large companies too. But, a fortiori, the courts will give more weight to "busi-
ness judgment" arguments in companies with traded shares than in close corporations.
0 This is not to say, however, that there are not feasible arrangements which would
net prices between six and fifteen dollars. Clearly, if competition for control of the com-
pany develops, the shareholders will realize a higher price. However, if no competition
develops, then we have no reliable way of knowing that the price should be different
than that offered. What is needed here is an effective device for encouraging more
outsiders to consider the takeover. Instead, Chairman Cohen's approach seems to go
in the opposite direction.
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qualified managers or a takeover by those who threaten disaster.
This is probably not an important part of the bill, but it can be used
to illustrate some of the more important problems which should be
considered. First, who is being protected by this disclosure? Pre-
sumably, in the case of sales to "good guys," existing shareholders
are being protected against selling the shares too cheaply. We have
already discussed this point and noted the special advantages afforded
shareholders by this group and the dangers which might flow from
inhibiting their freedom.
In the case of sales to "bad guys," it would seem at first glance
that shareholders are being protected against poor managers, but
this cannot be true for those who sell their shares. Having sold at a
price above the market, presumably they are satisfied with their trans-
action,31 and they may then be indifferent about the quality of
management. The answer must be that this disclosure is in the
interest of those shareholders who decide not to sell, 2 because they
did not know that crooks or poor managers were taking over their
business. Nevertheless, no shareholder has a guarantee against a
management change, and by not selling on the tender offer, these
shareholders have demonstrated that they would prefer remaining
with some new management. Thus it can be seen that this provision
is not likely to protect buyers or sellers of shares adequately through
the device of full disclosure. What it seems better designed for is
to aid the SEC in spotting what they consider to be undesirables try-
ing to take over corporations.
This brings us to one of the most basic points in this entire dis-
cussion: how much and what kind of protection can and should share-
holders receive against crooks and inefficient managers? In the case
of dishonest managers, the answer is fairly obvious. The public is
entitled to all the protection that substantive and procedural crim-
inal law afford-for crimes actually committedl We should remem-
3'Again it should be noted that the shareholders' only real cause for complaint
would be that the present management took a side payment, in some form, for ap-
proving the control change. These side payments are probably most likely in merger
situations, but they can occur with cash tender offers as well. See Manne, Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL EcoN. 110, 117 (1965).
32 "A change in control can result in what amounts to a new, or at least vastly
changed, company. A decision not to accept the offer amounts to a decision to buy
into that new company." Cohen, supra note 6, at 152. Chairman Cohen does not,
however, limit his defense to this argument.
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ber that our criminal law system, unlike administrative proceedings,
involves such basic protections as trial by jury, presumption of inno-
cence, and no double jeopardy. These traditional safeguards against
arbitrary government action should not be hastily sacrificed to the
interests of zealous administrators, even though a few dishonest
raiders may appear on the corporate scene. Certainly there have
been very few, and traditional criminal law enforcement is not so in-
adequate as to require more radical preventive measures. We all
may lose too much in the process of ferreting out a few bad operators.
Furthermore, even apart from the dangers of abuse of power by
government officials, the present scheme is wrongly conceived. If
the SEC's real concern is with potentially inefficient managers, then
their solution should have been quite different. An unhampered
and unregulated market for corporate control will be far more
effective in gaining efficient management for shareholders than plans
based on the idea of millions of unsophisticated shareholders making
intelligent decisions about the relative qualities of opposing manage-
ment groups, even those with criminal records.
Consideration should have been given instead to various proposals
which would allow the market for corporate control to function
more freely and more perfectly than it presently does. For instance,
if more waiting time were required between director approval of
mergers and submission for approval of shareholders, there would be
more possibility of competing offers being generated. 33 And we have
already noticed the desirable effects which might flow from announce-
ments of liquidation values, though there are large problems in
connection with this proposal. If shareholders were allowed to
propose mergers or liquidations without prior approval of the board
of directors, there would be less chance of the directors enjoying the
entire value of the premium for control.34 Finally, consideration
might be given to a rule that would simply put the burden of proof
on directors to show that they have explored all feasible alternative
offers for control before settling on one and that the alternative
23 See Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1427,
1438 (1964).
31 See ibid. A somewhat related idea would be to make shareholder lists, with
addresses and numbers of shares, more easily available than they are at present. In-
deed, this single change might do more to liven competition in the market for corporate
control than anything else.
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selected was most in the shareholders' interest. 5 As things presently
stand, directors have an extremely strong temptation to negotiate
the merger or perhaps cash takeover bid which will, in one way or
another, benefit them personally the most. After that agreement is
negotiated, there is little if anything shareholders can do to generate
a more favorable alternate plan. Since the director-approved pro-
posal will be better for the shareholders than nothing, shareholder
approval is normally obtainable with no difficulty.
Source of Funds
Another interesting requirement of the statute is that the source
of funds must be disclosed before the tender offer is made. Anyone
familiar with the SEC's concern with the use of funds from Swiss
banks may immediately suspect an ulterior motive here. Clearly, an
individual who decides to sell his shares cannot be injured by the
fact that the lender of funds used in a tender offer was a Swiss bank,
Aunt Jenny, or the Coga Nostra.3 6  However, we should not be
fooled into thinking that mere disclosure of such a matter is an
innocent and passive kind of regulation. On the contrary, this pro-
vision would considerably enhance the SEC's powers over foreign
sources of funds,3 7 even though there is today no directly authorized
method for acquiring this power. But if this power is to be given the
SEC-and perhaps it should be-full hearings on that subject seem
in order. As it is, this provision appears to be sneaking in the back
door.
85 See ibid.
36 This is not to say that the use to which profits from criminal activity are put
is not an important matter for government concern. It is, and it has been, appropriately
investigated by many agencies. It is nonetheless questionable whether it is relevant in
the present context. Certainly most shareholders who sell out are unconcerned about
the identity of the buyer of their shares or the source of his funds.
87 Power over foreign monetary sources would come from the kinds of disclosure the
SEC could demand. For instance, before funds borrowed from the Swiss bank could
be used; the SEC may demand disclosure of the names of depositors in that bank, whose
funds might directly or indirectly be involved, even though Swiss domestic law forbids
disclosure of those names. This example may in turn be related to another point that
Chairman Cohen discusses, contrasting the SEC's position with that of the legislation
in Canada, where a takeover bid can be made for an undisclosed principal. The bill
before Congress would not allow this. Cohen tells us that in the report leading to the
Canadian legislation, fears were expressed that such disclosure might discourage some
takeover bids. But the Chairman states categorically that "the materiality to share-
holders of the identity of the potential control person ... is simply too great not to
require that it be disclosed." Cohen, supra note 6, at 154.
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Description of "Special Arrangements"
The proposed legislation would also require that "special arrange-
ments," including options, guaranties, and proxies, be fully de-
scribed. This provision will serve to illustrate another crucial
problem with this kind of regulation. Again, on the surface it seems
innocent enough; if truthful and full disclosure is made, there seems
to be no substantive "punch" to the provision. Unfortunately, this
overlooks the myriad ways in which both government and private
lawyers discover new grounds for law suits, and we must keep in mind
that the incumbent managers will almost inevitably be hostile to the
tender group. If the management can find any superficially reason-
able basis for bringing a law suit, they may be able to delay the tender
offer in such a way as to effectively kill it. Recent Supreme Court
cases make it quite easy for civil actions, including the right to sue
for an injunction, to be brought on the basis of the various federal
security acts.3 The bill under consideration is replete with dis-
closure requirements for mafterial that could serve as the basis for
law suits, most of which would in fact be tactical devices for delay.
Freezing Prices
It often occurs with a tender offer for control that the first offering
price is insufficient to gain the desired number of shares. In this
case second and perhaps additional tender offers may be made in
order to secure the needed shares. This is particularly apt to occur
if for any reason-always in the shareholders' interest-competing
offers develop, or the incumbent managers do or say something to
raise the price of the shares. This would always seem to signify the
appropriate functioning of the market, since each increment in the
offering price should elicit an additional market supply of shares.30
Unfortunately, however, the bill under consideration would
11 See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
30A price increment will tend to increase supply because individuals will have
different marginal utilities for their shares. Their offering of shares in turn dictates
the supply curve of a particular stock, which will always be positively sloped. See
LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RE.SOURCE ALLOCATION 44 (3d ed. 1966); STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966). It certainly cannot be said that the highest price
reached in this process is in any relevant sense the "correct" price or the "adequate"
price or the "fair" price. It is simply the price required to call forth the final incre-
ment of shares demanded by the buyer.
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prevent just that perfect functioning of the market. One provision
requires all shareholders to receive the higher price in a second
tender offer, even though many may have accepted the lower price of
an earlier offer. Here again, in the name of some misplaced concept
of equal treatment, there appears to be some misunderstanding of
how competitive markets function. 40 It is no proof of an invidious
form of price discrimination that identical goods may be acquired at
varying prices at different times, and there is no logic known to eco-
nomic theory or law dictating that individual contracts should not be
enforced merely because at a later time the price goes up. Carried
to its logical extreme, Chairman Cohen's notion would require all
transactions in the open market to be treated in the same way.
Whether there was a tender offer or not, if control were sought, the
same argument for equal treatment could be made. The net effect
of the bill's provision is simply to raise the cost of acquiring corporate
control, but with no evident justification.
Disclosure of Market Activities
The bill also requires disclosure of the offeror's market actvities
in the company's securities. This provision may be related to the
requirement that if a tender price is increased in a second offer, all
shareholders are entitled to receive the new price. Here, the concern
may be with those shareholders who sold on the open market prior
to the announcement of the tender. Generally such an announce-
ment causes an immediate increase in the market price for shares.
As is true with any undisclosed favorable news, the sellers have sold
for less than they could get if they had held their shares until after
40 This same error regarding the nature of competitive processes occurs in Chairman
Cohen's defense of another provision of the bill: "For similar and additional reasons we
also wanted to avoid having shareholders rush to accept an offer. To accomplish this,
we suggested that where the person making the offer takes less than all the shares
tendered, he should be required to take them on a pro rata basis." Cohen, supra note 6,
at 153-54. Clearly what has happened in such a circumstance is that the offering
price was too high, as the proper offering price should just elicit the desired number of
shares. But it does not follow in the name of equal treatment that pro rating is the
indicated solution. The mathematical and administrative problems in administering
this solution can be horrendous, and they will represent a sharp increase in cost
for the outsider. Some, however, will want to condition their offer on pro rata
acceptance if too many shares are offered. This may be because the offeror prefers
this solution even with a higher cost or because he does not see the total cost as being
significantly higher. But for those who do, Chairman Cohen has not offered a
good reason why pro rating should be mandatory.
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the announcement.41 Those shareholders who sold in the open
market prior to the announcement of the tender offer might be in
a position to sue under SEC Rule lOb-5 to recover the higher price
paid in the tender offer.42 Thus, again the effect of the bill is to
raise the total cost of buying control by preventing outsiders from
utilizing the best combination of market strategies.
Disclosure of Business Plans
One of the key provisions of the bill requires a purchaser of
control to disclose in advance his plans for the future conduct of the
business, including whether he plans to liquidate it. There are
several fundamental problems in this provision. First of all, there is
a subtle implication that liquidation is an undesirable policy from
the shareholders' point of view.4 3 This, of course, is nonsense; it may
be their most desirable course. It should not be treated differently
or more harshly in this context than any other management policy.
However, the biggest problem with this provision may come from
minority shareholders seeking to upset management decisions by
holding management to the policy specified under the tender offer
disclosure requirement. At least one case 44 has specifically allowed
such a contention to succeed, though it is far from certain that other
courts would follow the broad grant of managerial power given
minority shareholders by that decision. Even if civil suits of this
sort are not generally successful, 45 no one would question the SEC's
"See MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 86-90 (1966).
42 Cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (application of lOb-5 to situation involving undisclosed
merger negotiations).
"Cf. note 14 supra.
"United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., CCH 1961-1964 FED. SEC. L. REP. 91288
(Md., Baltimore City Cir. Ct., May 16, 1963).
ir J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), make it clear that a civil action is available. United
Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., supra note 44, stands for the proposition that action
contrary to intentions stated in a prospectus under the '33 Act provides the' basis
for a cause of action. The case involved a management attempt to maintain control
of a corporation by issuing non-voting shares. The effect of this would have been to
cause the corporation to be delisted by the New York Stock Exchange, and this, the
court held, was contrary to a promise implied in the prospectus. Even though cases
under the provision being discussed might not involve control, as the United Funds
case did, the logic would still seem applicable. If any program contrary to that
proposed in the disclosure lost money, a civil action to recover that loss from the
managers might succeed.
At a very minimum, if we must have statutory regulation of cash tender offers, the
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authority to bring action for false and misleading statements if
management veered too far from the policies announced in its tender
offer. This would, in effect, put every company which was the sub-
ject of a successful takeover in the same category as corporations
subject to the far-reaching provisions of the Investment Company
Act of 1940.46
More important, however, is the fact that this provision, which
not only requires disclosure of future plans but involves some risk of
liability if they are not carefully observed, applies only to tender
offerors. We have no comparable requirement for incumbent man-
agers. They may change their management policies almost at will
and without fear of liability simply for doing so.4 7 Clearly, this is a
very substantial burden placed on the outsider compared to that
placed on existing managers. And yet no reason is offered why suc-
cessful bidders should operate under this kind of handicap. We are
not entitled to any easy assumption that they are less able, less honest,
or more "affected with a public interest" than those managers who
have not been displaced.
Still a third problem with this provision involves the matter of
industry competition. It is almost inconceivable that public dis-
closure of future plans for operation, or liquidation, would not be of
very keen interest to competitors. Nor is it satisfactory for the SEC
to offer to keep such matters confidential. This would surely put
the SEC into the business of approving or disapproving changes in
the plan previously disclosed. But whether the plan is disclosed or
confidential, how many potential managers want to be strictly held
to follow a specific program of operation? Outside potential man-
agers are in an especially bad position to formulate policy of this sort,
and they should not be required to do so. This may indeed be the
bill should specify that only the SEC and not private litigants are authorized to
raise these questions of business policy. Cf. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5:
Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Ray. 627 (1963). The sound
argument for the business judgment rule to prevent courts from making or second-
guessing purely business decisions should not be lost accidentally. It is another thing,
of course, to give that authority to an expert agency. It still may not be a good idea,
but it is not as inappropriate as forcing that responsibility onto the courts.
"6 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-14 (1964).
11 The only general limitations upon incumbent managers would seem to be an
action like that in United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., CCH 1961-1964 FED. Seo.
L. REP. 91288 (Md., Baltimore City Cir. Ct., May 16, 1963), relying heavily on RSTATE-
MENT, CONMArS § 90 (1932) (promissory estoppel); an action based on the ultra vires
doctrine, or one based on an express promise.
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single most damaging provision in the entire bill, and yet, without
it, the thrust of the SEC's major concern over cash tender offers seems
lost.
Shareholder's Option to Withdraw
Another provision of the bill gives shareholders seven days after
acceptance of an offer to withdraw. This is done in order to let
incumbents battle the attempted takeover after they learn of it.
Chairman Cohen stated that the twenty-day notification-to-the-corpo-
ration provision of an earlier draft gave too great an advantage to
incumbent groups. The SEC also proposes a five-day, confidential,
pre-offer notification provision.48
It is hard to imagine a more unsettling kind of arrangement. It
will be difficult and costly for offerors to keep their financing com-
mitments intact for this additional week. This provision in effect
requires offerors to give a seven-day "put" to all shareholders for no
compensation. If the market goes down for any reason, these share-
holders will be in the strange position of having an option to sell.
If it goes up, however, they are not obliged to sell. Clearly this kind
of risk assumption, as the normal commercial market for puts indi-
cates, is costly. Thus, in still another way does this regulation raise
the cost of acquiring corporate control.
Chairman Cohen justifies the seven-day provision on the ground
that management should have an opportunity to make its case after
a tender offer has occurred. Presumably, this means that Chairman
Cohen is in agreement with the statement of various corporate man-
agers that the current stock market price for their company's shares
is not the correct price and should be higher, although the SEC has
recently taken steps to police and regulate the activities of corpora-
tions seeking to publicize their own stock in order to raise its price.49
However, if the present market price is indeed incorrect, then the
stock market is not functioning properly to determine the price of
securities, and the SEC ought to find out why. But, assuming im-
perfections in the market, companies should be allowed to tout their
"'The bill as actually introduced contains an additional provision, § 2 (4), allowing
shareholders to withdraw their acceptance at any time within sixty days after the
tender offer was made. See note 5 supra. This could, in many instances, provide a
longer period for an incumbent counterattack than the original twenty-day waiting
period.
" See Cohen, -supra note 6,. at 155-56.
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own shares in order to correct the market price, or outsiders should
be allowed to perform that function.
In fact there are no indications that the market is not correctly
performing its pricing function. Therefore, to say that existing man-
agement should be given an opportunity to make its case when con-
fronted by a tender offer in excess of the present market price sug-
gests that the SEC is taking sides and assisting incumbent managers
in what should be a hands-off fight. The seven-day time period is
not long enough (or the circumstances appropriate) for the develop-
ment of real competitive offers, so the major effect of this time
requirement will be to allow management to find some grounds for
a delaying injunction.
CONCLUSION
One might have thought the need for legislation of this sort would
be documented by obvious cases of malfunctioning of the market for
corporate control. It is interesting, therefore, to note that the Chair-
man of the Securities and Exchange Commission does not offer a
single case establishing any injury or socially undesirable conduct
which can be cured only through the mechanisms of this bill.
The really undesirable cases which do come up in discussions of this
subject almost inevitably involve criminal actions, common law
fraud, or manipulation. In many of these cases the burden of proof
required by courts of law is quite strict; but this burden of proof,
whether it arises in litigation or in administrative proceedings, should
not be relaxed too much. Without clear evidence of undesirable
effects from a practice like tender offers the strict rules for proof of
fraud serve the salutary function of preventing excessively easy and
therefore possibly arbitrary regulation of free markets. Certainly it
is an insufficient justification that the stricter standards of proof put
a heavier work burden on the administrators of our security laws.
Chairman Cohen claims that the Commission already has author-
ity without additional legislation to promulgate rules having the
same effect as the bill under consideration. 0 That statement should
not be taken at face value. There are many procedural and judicial
safeguards built into the administrative rule-making procedure that
do not apply to congressional action. There must, for example, gen-
erally be careful and detailed hearings with notice given to inter-
sold. at 156.
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ested parties,51 and the judicial review is far more detailed and
effective. 52 It is on occasion much easier to get an act through Con-
gress than a rule through the SEC. This is especially true when
political forces are such that the bill may have a. good chance of
passing for reasons unrelated to its intrinsic merits.
It is not difficult to guess how bills such as the one under consid-
eration come to be proposed. These bills were probably incited by
occasions on which corporate control was lost as a result of public
cash tender offers. These may have been classic cases of takeovers
by an honest entrepreneur acting in his own self-interest but inci-
dentally benefiting all the noncontrolling shareholders in the corpo-
ration. The ousted heads of the companies, or perhaps their invest-
ment bankers,5 3 might have complained bitterly to their congressmen,
thus precipitating legislation like that under consideration.5 4 It is
ironic to find the SEC taking sides with those identical interests.
As noted above, if these provisions resulted from SEC rule-
making, careful analysis of the whole subject might be required.
In place of a systematic analysis, however, we find the following
statement: "While the disclosure required by the bills might dis-
courage some tender offers, it is perhaps a small price to pay for an
informed choice by shareholders."' 5 Chairman Cohen really begs all
the difficult questions in this statement. How many tender offers will
be discouraged? What is the price that shareholders will thereby
be paying? How is this to be computed? No intelligent decisions
can be made in this field until these questions can be answered with
some degree of accuracy. Systematic study and answers to these
questions should be forthcoming before this legislation is advanced.
That is, after all, why administrative agencies comprised of experts
in the field were established.
5- 5 U.S.C-A. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Special Pamphlet 1966).
'4 DAvis, ADMINISTmxVE LAW TREATiSE §§ 29.01-.11 (1958, Supp. 1965).
'Investment bankers, who have a continuing interest in the management of many
companies, are a likely source of pressure for this bill, as are insecure managers who
fear an attempted takeover.
r The original -version of the Williams bill, with which the SEC disagreed, had a
provision strongly manifesting the inspiration of incumbent management. That bill
would have required twenty days advance notice to the corporation before tenders could
be solicited. Nothing appeared in that version suggesting the necessity of disclosure
to the shareholders, or, for that matter, to the SEC. Such a provision could certainly
not have been proposed with the interest of shareholders in mind. Rather it seems to
have been exclusively designed to protect and insulate incumbent management, no
matter how bad, from outsiders.
I5 Cohen, supra note 6, at 151-52. (Emphasis added.)
